Shuttle Car Operator

The victim was fatally injured when struck by a battery powered scoop which had trammed through a line curtain in the #6 Entry of the #5 Unit (MMU 009-0) outby the working place where the continuous mining machine was being operated.

Texto original en inglés de la MSHA

On Tuesday, October 13, 2020, at 8:45 p.m., Phillip T. Ramsey, a 58-year-old Shuttle Car Operator with thirty years of mining experience, was fatally injured when he was struck by a battery-powered scoop. Ramsey had parked his shuttle car in an intersection behind an opaque ventilation curtain and was exiting the cab of the shuttle car when a battery-powered scoop trammed through the ventilation curtain and struck him. The accident occurred because the mine operator did not: (1) prevent scoops from being trammed through ventilation curtains that restrict visibility, (2) prevent section equipment from being parked in intersections behind ventilation curtains, (3) ensure effective communication between mobile equipment operators, and (4) ensure that effective audible warnings are used prior to equipment being trammed through ventilation curtains.

1. The scoop involved in the accident was not equipped with a PDS.

   Acción correctiva: The mine operator recently installed a redesigned PDS on a scoop with newly developed zone configurations that are expected to be less susceptible to nuisance slowdown and shutdown events. In addition, enhanced audible and visible warnings were integrated with the PDS and machine control system.

2. The mine operator’s policies, procedures, and programs did not address the installation of opaque line ventilation curtain in an intersection. The non-transparent line ventilation curtain prevented the scoop operator from seeing the shuttle car parked on the other side.

3. The mine operator did not have a policy or procedure to prevent miners from parking shuttle cars in intersections behind ventilation curtains.

   Acción correctiva: The mine operator developed and implemented the following written policy and provided training for miners: all rubber tired mobile equipment operators are to position their equipment to prevent the deck from being struck by other equipment if they have to stop or park in an intersection beside or behind ventilation curtains.

4. The mine operator had no policy or procedure that required scoop operators to receive acknowledgement of their radio transmissions of their intended routes of travel, from all shuttle car operators, prior to proceeding.

   Acción correctiva: The mine operator developed and implemented the following written policy and provided training for miners: radio communication concerning intent of scoop travel will be verified by all affected shuttle car operators prior to scoops intersecting shuttle car haulage routes.

5. The mine operator had no policy or procedure related to the sounding of an audible warning device by scoop operators to provide an alert prior to scoops being trammed through ventilation curtains.

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Hallazgos del informe final de investigación de la MSHA, que sustituye la narrativa preliminar anterior.

Actividad al momento del incidente

Shuttle Car, Ram Car, Buggy

Subunidad / ubicación

UNDERGROUND

Ubicación subterránea

INTERSECTION

Método de minería

Continuous Mining

Tipo de accidente

Golpeado por objeto motorizado en movimiento

Fuente de la lesión

MINE JEEP,KERSEY,JITNEY

Naturaleza de la lesión

CRUSHING

Parte del cuerpo afectada

MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)

Experiencia minera total

30 years

Experiencia en esta mina

2 years

Experiencia en este puesto

2 years

Grado de la lesión

FATALITY