Mining Incidents
Muerte · Registro MSHA n.º 220181430023

Dryer Operator

9 de mayo de 2018 a las 6:15 PM
Alabaster Plant · Facility · Metal/Non-Metal
Shelby Condado, AL
Clasificación IGNICIÓN O EXPLOSIÓN DE GAS O POLVO
Tipo Contacto con objetos o sustancias calientes
Narrativa del investigador
The injured miner & the supervisor were attempting to light the #2 kiln's gas flame. While the miner was holding a flare attached to a metal pole at the end of the gas pipe, the supervisor turned on the gas. In the process of lighting, the gas ignited & blew back through the front of the kiln causing burns to the right side of the miner's body. On 5/28/18 the EE passed away.

Texto original en inglés de la MSHA

Investigación final de la MSHA
Benjamin Ballard, a 27-year old Kiln System Technician with 32 weeks of experience, received severe burn injuries while igniting natural gas to pre-heat a rotary kiln on May 9, 2018. Ballard used a standard road flare attached to the end of an angle iron rod to manually light the kiln while his supervisor adjusted the gas valve. The first attempt to light the kiln failed. During the second attempt, fire blew out of the kiln access door (blowback) injuring Ballard. Ballard was transported by helicopter to an emergency burn center. He died on May 28, 2018, as a result of his injuries. The accident occurred because the mine operator: Did not ensure that the natural gas was purged after the initial lighting failure. Did not ensure the victim had been properly task trained in lighting kilns. Did not provide proper personal protective equipment and clothing for lighting kilns Did not have safe procedures in place for lighting the kiln.
Causas fundamentales
  1. The operator’s procedures for kiln lighting did not address purging after flame failure and did not specify a maximum time the secondary gas valve could remain open while attempting to light the kiln. This resulted in natural gas accumulating in the kiln chamber.

    Acción correctiva: The mine operator implemented new procedures that require purging after flame failure. The new procedures also specify the maximum time the secondary gas valve can remain open when attempting to light the kiln. The length of time the gas valve is open is not to exceed 15 seconds. All affected miners have been trained in these new procedures.

  2. The mine operator did not ensure the victim was properly trained in the task of lighting kilns.

    Acción correctiva: All affected miners have been task trained in new kiln lighting procedures.

  3. Proper PPE and clothing were not required to be used while lighting the kiln.

    Acción correctiva: Proper PPE and clothing have been provided and are required to be worn when lighting the kiln. This PPE includes an arc flash protective suit with hood and leg extensions, heat resistant gloves, safety glasses, and steel-toed boots.

  4. The mine operator’s procedures required miners to be positioned in front of an open kiln access door while lighting the kiln.

    Acción correctiva: The mine operator developed procedures that require the miner to insert a rod with lit flare through a tube that extends into the chamber. The rod is clamped in place and the miner moves to a safe location before gas is applied. The kiln access door remains closed. (See APPENDIX C – Kiln #2 Modification)

Hallazgos del informe final de investigación de la MSHA, que sustituye la narrativa preliminar anterior.

Detalles del registro
Actividad al momento del incidente
Machine Maintenance
Subunidad / ubicación
MILL OPERATION/PREPARATION PLANT
Tipo de accidente
Contacto con objetos o sustancias calientes
Fuente de la lesión
FLAME,FIRE,SMOKE,(Not Elsewhere Classified)
Naturaleza de la lesión
BURN OR SCALD (HEAT)
Parte del cuerpo afectada
MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)
Experiencia minera total
0 years
Experiencia en esta mina
0 years
Experiencia en este puesto
0 years
Grado de la lesión
FATALITY
Verificar en MSHA

Cada registro de esta página refleja lo que publica la MSHA en su programa de Datos Abiertos del Gobierno, actualizado semanalmente. La MSHA no publica URLs por accidente (los datos de Accidentes se distribuyen en un único archivo masivo), así que esta es la forma de recuperar la fuente del registro específico a continuación:

Fuente: Administración de Seguridad y Salud Minera de EE. UU. (MSHA) · Documento 220181430023 · ID de mina 0101264 Vista de capacitación →