Groundman

Victim used an aerial lift positioned under the #3 tunnel belt to access the take-up pulley assemble components. As the victim was attempting to manually clean the north side of the west bend pulley, ee became entangled between the rotating pulley and the moving conveyor belt, resulting in a fatal injuries.

Texto original en inglés de la MSHA

On August 22, 2018, Brent D. Cosner, a 29-year old Groundman with 1 year of experience, died while attempting to clean a buildup of material from a rotating conveyor bend pulley. Cosner was standing on an aerial lift and manually scraping the conveyor bend pulley with a 15-inch pry bar, when he became entangled between the bend pulley and the moving conveyor belt. The accident occurred because the conveyor was not de-energized, locked out or blocked against hazardous motion before the victim attempted to clean the bend pulley. Mine management did not provide appropriate task training to the victim on the hazards associated with the work being performed.

1. Management did not establish policies and procedures to ensure proper cleaning of the conveyor components at the mine, including the take-up bend pulleys on the No. 3 tunnel belt conveyor.

   Acción correctiva: Management installed self-cleaning wing bend pulleys and two belt scrapers to remove build-up on the return side of the belts prior to reaching the bend pulleys. The mine operator established and implemented a written policy outlining the proper procedures for cleaning conveyor components. All miners responsible for cleaning conveyor components were trained in the new policy and procedures.

2. The No. 3 Tunnel Belt Conveyor was not de-energized, locked out, or blocked against hazardous motion prior to the victim performing a maintenance task (manually cleaning the take-up bend pulley).

   Acción correctiva: Management had a maintenance checklist for employees’ use prior to performing maintenance tasks on plant machinery, which included the requirement to lock out and tag out the various components. After the accident, management instituted a formal Repair Order Lock Out / Tag Out policy and trained all miners in its requirements, which included blocking critical components.

3. Management did not provide all of the required 30 CFR Part 46 training to the victim who was hired as a new miner.

   Acción correctiva: To address training deficiencies found and cited during the E16 Spot Inspection, the operator has revised the training plan and provided additional training to employees, as needed.

Hallazgos del informe final de investigación de la MSHA, que sustituye la narrativa preliminar anterior.

Actividad al momento del incidente

Surface Equipment, Nec

Subunidad / ubicación

MILL OPERATION/PREPARATION PLANT

Tipo de accidente

Atrapado en, bajo o entre objetos en movimiento o engranados

Fuente de la lesión

BELT CONVEYORS

Naturaleza de la lesión

CRUSHING

Parte del cuerpo afectada

MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)

Experiencia minera total

1 year

Experiencia en esta mina

1 year

Experiencia en este puesto

1 year

Grado de la lesión

FATALITY