Groundman
Victim used an aerial lift positioned under the #3 tunnel belt to access the take-up pulley assemble components. As the victim was attempting to manually clean the north side of the west bend pulley, ee became entangled between the rotating pulley and the moving conveyor belt, resulting in a fatal injuries.
On August 22, 2018, Brent D. Cosner, a 29-year old Groundman with 1 year of experience, died while attempting to clean a buildup of material from a rotating conveyor bend pulley. Cosner was standing on an aerial lift and manually scraping the conveyor bend pulley with a 15-inch pry bar, when he became entangled between the bend pulley and the moving conveyor belt. The accident occurred because the conveyor was not de-energized, locked out or blocked against hazardous motion before the victim attempted to clean the bend pulley. Mine management did not provide appropriate task training to the victim on the hazards associated with the work being performed.
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Management did not establish policies and procedures to ensure proper cleaning of the conveyor components at the mine, including the take-up bend pulleys on the No. 3 tunnel belt conveyor.
Corrective action: Management installed self-cleaning wing bend pulleys and two belt scrapers to remove build-up on the return side of the belts prior to reaching the bend pulleys. The mine operator established and implemented a written policy outlining the proper procedures for cleaning conveyor components. All miners responsible for cleaning conveyor components were trained in the new policy and procedures.
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The No. 3 Tunnel Belt Conveyor was not de-energized, locked out, or blocked against hazardous motion prior to the victim performing a maintenance task (manually cleaning the take-up bend pulley).
Corrective action: Management had a maintenance checklist for employees’ use prior to performing maintenance tasks on plant machinery, which included the requirement to lock out and tag out the various components. After the accident, management instituted a formal Repair Order Lock Out / Tag Out policy and trained all miners in its requirements, which included blocking critical components.
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Management did not provide all of the required 30 CFR Part 46 training to the victim who was hired as a new miner.
Corrective action: To address training deficiencies found and cited during the E16 Spot Inspection, the operator has revised the training plan and provided additional training to employees, as needed.
Findings from MSHA's final investigation report, which supersedes the preliminary narrative above.
- Activity at time of incident
- Surface Equipment, Nec
- Subunit / location
- MILL OPERATION/PREPARATION PLANT
- Accident type
- Caught in, under or between running or meshing objects
- Source of injury
- BELT CONVEYORS
- Nature of injury
- CRUSHING
- Body part affected
- MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)
- Total mining experience
- 1 year
- Experience at this mine
- 1 year
- Experience in this job
- 1 year
- Degree of injury
- FATALITY
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- Final investigation report: Read MSHA's final report
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Accident record:
Download MSHA Accidents.zip
then search for Document number
220182560021(the unique key per MSHA Form 7000-1) -
Mine record:
MSHA Mine Data Retrieval System
and search by Mine ID
3608803 - All MSHA datasets: Open Government Data program directory covering Accident, Mines, Inspections, Violations, etc.