Belt Foreman

On 7/29/16, employee and co-worker were re-welding guards over the drive shaft of the turbine pump located on the surface above the #3 Shaft. Shortly after welding was completed, an ignition occurred in the #3 Shaft and employee received significant burns and lacerations. The investigation of this event is on-going. Employee died from the injuries on 8/4/16.

Texto original en inglés de la MSHA

At 11:00 a.m. on Friday July 29, 2016, Donald E. Workman, Maintenance Foreman, and Charles H. Blankenship, Chief Electrician, traveled to the Rt. 16 #3 shaft to repair loose guarding. At approximately 12:00 p.m., the two miners were welding threaded blocks to secure the guarding from vibration when a methane explosion occurred from within the shaft. Workman, who was standing on expanded metal grating over the #3 shaft sustained serious injuries. On August 4, 2016, Mr. Workman died due to the injuries received during the accident. Blankenship did not receive any injuries during the accident.

1. Suitable precautions were not taken to prevent smoldering metal or sparks from entering the unventilated #3 shaft as required by 30 CFR §77.1112(a).

   Acción correctiva: After the accident, the operator submitted an addendum to the ventilation plan and it was approved by MSHA. This addendum lists safety precautions regarding the #3 shaft. The safety precautions include, but are not limited to, the following: No flame cutting, welding or grinding within 35 feet of the #3 shaft is permitted. If cutting or welding is needed within 35 feet of the shaft, a barrier will be installed to prevent sparks or hot slag from entering the shaft. Also, a cutting and welding plan shall be submitted to MSHA and must be approved by MSHA before cutting and welding is performed. Furthermore, the shaft will be continuously ventilated at all times. The shaft will be continuously monitored for methane at depths of 50 feet, 350 feet, and 550 feet any time work is done on the site. Work will be stopped if methane is detected at 1% or greater.

2. Mine management failed to conduct adequate examinations for methane in the #3 shaft immediately before and periodically while welding directly over the #3 shaft as required by 30 CFR §77.1112(b). Though the methane concentration was below 1% above the shaft, no attempt was made to determine the concentration of methane below the collar of the #3 shaft.

   Acción correctiva: The operator submitted an addendum indicating the safety precautions to be taken during the #3 Shaft Rehabilitation/Ventilation Plan. This addendum has been made part of the approved ventilation plan.

Hallazgos del informe final de investigación de la MSHA, que sustituye la narrativa preliminar anterior.

Actividad al momento del incidente

Welding Or Cutting

Subunidad / ubicación

SURFACE AT UNDERGROUND

Tipo de accidente

Contacto con objetos o sustancias calientes

Fuente de la lesión

FLAME,FIRE,SMOKE,(Not Elsewhere Classified)

Naturaleza de la lesión

BURN OR SCALD (HEAT)

Parte del cuerpo afectada

MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)

Experiencia minera total

40 years

Experiencia en esta mina

0 years

Experiencia en este puesto

18 years

Grado de la lesión

FATALITY