A fully trained miner was fatally injured while attempting to remove a splice pin from a 72" mechanical belt splice. The splice was positioned near the outby side of the tail frame. The victim was positioned between the bottom conveyor belt and the top conveyor belt. Investigation is on-going by company, state and federal officials.
Robert E Murray: 24 muertes registradas controlador
Seguir este controlador
Avísenme cuando se presente un nuevo incidente de la MSHA en cualquier mina que controle Robert E Murray.
ⓘ
Esta tasa son las citaciones registradas divididas entre las horas de inspección de la MSHA, por cada 100 horas. Refleja el esfuerzo de inspección, no el tamaño de la mina ni la producción.ⓘ
Una orden bajo la Sección 107(a) retira a los mineros de un área cuando un inspector detecta un peligro inminente. Cada orden se levanta una vez corregida la condición, por lo que esto cuenta las órdenes emitidas, no las que están en vigor ahora.ⓘ
Las diferencias entre las multas propuestas y las pagadas reflejan tanto acuerdos y reducciones en conferencia como montos aun adeudados. Pendiente es el saldo que se debe actualmente.ⓘ
Las proporciones se calculan sobre las citaciones que llevan la codificación de gravedad y negligencia de la MSHA; una pequeña parte de los registros no está codificada.ⓘ
Esta tasa son los casos de lesión reportables por cada 100 trabajadores a tiempo completo por año, calculada como 200,000 por los casos dividido entre las horas-empleado reportadas por el operador a la MSHA. Los casos son lesiones que la MSHA clasificó en grado 01 a 07; se excluyen los eventos de solo accidente que no lesionaron a nadie, y también las lesiones de contratistas, cuyas horas no corresponden a una sola mina. Las tasas comienzan en el año 2000, cuando inicia el reporte trimestral de empleo, y se omiten por debajo de 20,000 horas en un año.| Año | tasa de casos totales | días perdidos | mortales |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 7.70 | 6.45 | 0.000 |
| 2019 | 7.80 | 5.93 | 0.021 |
| 2018 | 7.10 | 5.26 | 0.000 |
| 2017 | 8.20 | 5.35 | 0.000 |
| 2016 | 7.30 | 4.36 | 0.023 |
| 2015 | 5.86 | 4.22 | 0.016 |
| 2014 | 5.60 | 3.53 | 0.013 |
| 2013 | 7.24 | 4.01 | 0.028 |
ⓘ
Una muestra es una medición de cumplimiento en un momento dado, no un historial de exposición individual. Estas cifras describen registros de muestreo de MSHA y no establecen causalidad ni dosis personal.Polvo respirable de carbón
ⓘ
Las cifras de polvo respirable de carbón y sílice corresponden a instalaciones de carbón. El cumplimiento del polvo se mide frente a la norma actual de 1.5 mg/m3; se incluyen muestras anteriores a la norma de 2014, por lo que las tasas de cumplimiento son una senal historica aproximada.
Última medición: 2026-03-11
ⓘ
Las cifras de polvo respirable de carbón y sílice corresponden a instalaciones de carbón. El cumplimiento del polvo se mide frente a la norma actual de 1.5 mg/m3; se incluyen muestras anteriores a la norma de 2014, por lo que las tasas de cumplimiento son una senal historica aproximada.ⓘ
El valor de concentración excesiva (ECV) es el umbral de aplicación por muestra de la propia MSHA, que incorpora la incertidumbre de medición; una muestra por encima de su ECV puede motivar una citación. El conteo cubre solo las muestras a las que MSHA asignó un ECV.- CONTINUOUS MINER OPERATOR17,433
- LONGWALL OPERATOR (TAILGATE SIDE)4,866
- SHUTTLE CAR OPERATOR (STANDARD SIDE)4,275
Sílice (cuarzo)
Última medición: 2026-02-25- CONTINUOUS MINER OPERATOR1,493
- LONGWALL OPERATOR (TAILGATE SIDE)445
- ROOF BOLTER (TWIN HEAD) (RETURN SIDE)142
Ruido
ⓘ
La proporción cuenta las muestras de ruido cuya dosis medida superó el límite permisible de exposición de 90 dBA. Describe el lugar de trabajo muestreado, no lo que llegó al oído del minero: los programas de conservación de la audición y la protección auditiva usada durante el turno se registran por separado y no se reflejan aquí.
Última medición: 2026-02-19
ⓘ
La proporción cuenta las muestras de ruido cuya dosis medida superó el límite permisible de exposición de 90 dBA. Describe el lugar de trabajo muestreado, no lo que llegó al oído del minero: los programas de conservación de la audición y la protección auditiva usada durante el turno se registran por separado y no se reflejan aquí.- SHUTTLE CAR OPERATOR (STANDARD SIDE)583
- CONTINUOUS MINER OPERATOR557
- ROOF BOLTER (TWIN HEAD) (RETURN SIDE)384
ⓘ
Impugnar una citación ante la Comisión Federal de Revisión de Seguridad y Salud Minera es un derecho legal. Estas cifras presentan los resultados públicos de ese proceso, según el archivo de Violaciones Impugnadas de MSHA.- Conciliadas 16,748 · 95%
- Quedaron como emitidas 856 · 5%
- Anuladas o retiradas 5 · 0%
ⓘ
Una citación Significativa y Sustancial cuenta como sobreviviente cuando la conciliación o la decisión del juez mantuvo la designación, o cuando la impugnación fue desestimada o quedó en rebeldía y la citación quedó como emitida. Las citaciones anuladas o retiradas, y las conciliaciones que quitaron la designación, cuentan en contra.ⓘ
Una reducción o desestimación ante la Comisión es un resultado legítimo de impugnar una multa propuesta. Las cifras son el monto propuesto y el monto confirmado en la decisión del expediente.| Expediente | Decisión | Juez | Año | Propuesta / confirmada |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WEST 2008-1475 | Settlement | Manning | 2012 | $1.3M → $949K |
| LAKE 2008-666 | Prevail | Zielinski | 2017 | $961K → $80K |
| KENT 2012-490 | Settlement | Paez | 2014 | $508K → $301K |
| LAKE 2008-526 | Settlement | Manning | 2015 | $479K → $312K |
| WEST 2008-764 | Settlement | Manning | 2010 | $420K → $33K |
| LAKE 2009-35 | Prevail | McCarthy | 2016 | $344K → $179K |
Causas principales
- FALL OF FACE/RIB/PILLAR/SIDE/HIGHWALL 11 muertes · 130 no mortales
- MACHINERY 6 muertes · 845 no mortales
- POWERED HAULAGE 4 muertes · 600 no mortales
- FALL OF ROOF OR BACK 2 muertes · 2078 no mortales
- IGNITION OR EXPLOSION OF GAS OR DUST 1 muerte · 18 no mortales
- HANDLING OF MATERIALS 2787 no mortales
Cronología de incidentes
Operadores bajo este controlador
- The Marshall County Coal Company 280
- The Marion County Coal Company 188
- The Monongalia County Coal Company 117
- The Harrison County Coal Company 106
- The Ohio County Coal Company 99
- Murray Oak Grove Coal LLC 77
- American Energy Corporation 45
- Utah American Energy, Inc. 42
- KenAmerican Resources Inc 26
- Murray Maple Eagle Coal, LLC 16
- Illnois Land Resources, Inc. 1
- Maple Creek Mining Incorporated 1
- Ohio Valley Coal Resources, Inc. 1
- Ohio Valley Transloading Company 1
Minas en registro
- MARSHALL COUNTY MINE WV
- Marion County Mine WV
- Monongalia County Mine WV
- Oak Grove Mine AL
- OHIO COUNTY MINE WV
- Lila Canyon UT
- Harrison County Mine WV
- Oak Grove Preparation Plant AL
- Powhatan Transportation Center OH
- Maple Eagle No. 1 Mine WV
- Century Mine OH
- Powhatan No. 6 Mine OH
- New Era Mine IL
- Paradise #9 KY
- Maple Eagle Preparation Plant WV
- Sycamore Surface Mine WV
- Maple Creek Preparation Plant PA
Muertes bajo este controlador
24 registradasFMC employees were attempting to seal the hoist shaft at the Bremen Portal at Ken American Paradise Mine No. 9. Steel beams were welded in place metal decking was secured covering the shaft. Methane accumulated in the shaft and caused a series of two explosions 4-5 seconds apart. The second explosion killed FMC employee. No other fatalities or injuries occurred.
Oil leak was noticed during operation of the end loader. Foreman instructed operator to block the machine & went to get oil. Returned & found EE under the machine looking for the leak. Loader had been raised by tilting the bucket on the ground. Foreman got under machine to help look. Machine came down on top of them shortly after that, just as foreman saw that it was not blocked.
The 12 East longwall had mined out of seam from 3-10 shield. Shield tip to face had been roof bolted so the coal floor could be removed. The victim was standing with his back to the face. A rib struck the victim measuring 12' long by 4' wide by 1' thick. The victim was a trained and experienced longwall supervisor. The roof control and protective equipment were compliant.
EE was operating the company #24-43 Wagner ST 2DS Can-setter at x-cut #11 in B Canyon,#2 entry in the 23rd East intake. When the victim was found, he was unconscious & unresponsive, his mid torso was pinned in the articulation area of the machine. His feet were in the cab & he was seated in the seat. CPR was administered. The victim was pronounced dead upon arriving on the surface.
A fatal accident occurred on the longwall face around #144 shield. A ladder line hose got pinched under the toe of the #144 shield. EE did not see hose under shield and initiated the electronic push of the pan-line. The hose that was pinched under the toe of the shield, stretched by movement of pan-line, broke apart and high pressure emulsion fluid struck victim as he traveled by.
EE was cutting grass with 7300 compact track loader w/attached brush hog. For some unknown reason the machine lost traction and slid down small embankment into water. Cause of incident unknown at this time. Compliance with rules/reg not a factor, mining equip/system unknown to be a factor, but was used, PPE not a factor, job skills/miner proficiency/training/attitude not a factor.
Employee was directing an end loader towards himself to hook a strap to it for removal of a dolly that was used to move the hi-wall miner launch. Contributing factors were attempting to hook a 6' strap while standing in front of this moving machine and stationary dolly. Cause was human error/bad judgement by the victim and end loader opr.
The victim was leaning over a base lift jack housing. The molded casing catastrophically failed striking the victim in the chest from unknown/undetectable reasons. Cause was catastrophic failure of the housing. Compliance with rules/regs, protective items not a factor, miner proficiency may be a factor, mining equip/systems may be a factor.
On Thursday August 16, 2007 an outburst occurred during rescue work on the Main West panel. The outburst occurred in the No. 1 entry inby crosscut #126. Rescue work was ongoing to remove coal and debris which had filled the No. 1 entry during an outburst that occurred on August 6, 2007.
On Thursday, August 16, 2007 an outburst occurred during rescue work on the Main West Panel. The outburst occurred in the No. 1 entry inby crosscut 126. Rescue work was ongoing to remove coal and debris which had filled the No. 1 entry during an outburst that occurred on August 6, 2007.
On Thursday, August 16, 2007 an outburst occurred during rescue work on the Main West Panel. The outburst occurred in the No. 1 entry inby crosscut 126. Rescue work was ongoing to remove coal and debris which had filled the No. 1 entry during an outburst that occurred on August 6, 2007.
On August 6, 2007 at 2:50 am a bounce/outburst occurred at the Crandall Canyon Mine. It affected the current mining location in the South Barrier of West Mains extending outby to approx. X/C 119. The outburst affected all 4 entries and rescue operations were begun immediately. Rescue operations to reach the miners were unsuccessful.
On August 6, 2007 at 2:50 am a bounce/outburst occurred at the Crandall Canyon Mine. It affected the current mining location in the South Barrier of West Mains extending outby to approx. X/C 119. The outburst affected all 4 entries and rescue operations were begun immediately. Rescue operations to reach the miners were unsuccessful.
On August 6, 2007 at 2:50 am a bounce/outburst occurred at the Crandall Canyon Mine. It affected the current mining location in the South Barrier of West Mains extending outby to approx. X/C 119. The outburst affected all 4 entries and rescue operations were begun immediately. Rescue operations to reach the miners were unsuccessful.
On August 6, 2007 at 2:50 am a bounce/outburst occurred at the Crandall Canyon Mine. It affected the current mining location in the South Barrier of West Mains extending outby to approx. X/C 119. The outburst affected all 4 entries and rescue operations were begun immediately. Rescue operations to reach the miners were unsuccessful.
On August 6, 2007 at 2:50 am a bounce/outburst occurred at the Crandall Canyon Mine. It affected the current mining location in the South Barrier of West Mains extending outby to approx. X/C 119. The outburst affected all 4 entries and rescue operations were begun immediately. Rescue operations to reach the miners were unsuccessful.
On August 6, 2007 at 2:50 am a bounce/outburst occurred at the Crandall Canyon Mine. It affected the current mining location in the South Barrier of West Mains extending outby to approx. X/C 119. The outburst affected all 4 entries and rescue operations were begun immediately. Rescue operations to reach the miners were unsuccessful.
EMPLOYEE WAS APPARENTLY INSPECTING CONVEYOR BELT TAKE-UP AT 2ND M.NORTH DRIVE WHEN HIS LEFT ARM BECAME ENTANGLED BETWEEN THE BOTTOM BELT AND THE STATIONARY ROLLER, CAUSING AVULSION LEFT ARM AN D FACIAL INJURIES. ACCIDENT IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION BY COMPANY, STATE AND MSHA OFFICIALS. AUTOPSY PENDING.
A MINER OPERATOR WAS MINING IN THE M-2 (010-0) SECTION IN THE #23 ROOM BETWEEN #9 & #10 ENTRY. WHILE MINING THE 2ND HALF OF THE CUT A PIECE OF ROCK FELL FROM THE ROOF. THE ROCK STRUCK THE MAN ON THE HEAD. THE ROCK WAS APPROX. 15'4"L X 105" W X 0-4"T
WHILE HELPING TO INSTALL STEEL ARCHES A ROCK APPROXIMATELY 89"X33"X5"-14" DISLODGED FROM THE MINE ROOF STRIKING THE VICTIM
EE WAS ASSIGNED TO BURN AND WELD ON A BELT CONVEYOR TRANSFER. AFTER RETURNING FROM LUNCH. THE EE STARTED TO BURN METAL WHEN A SLAB OF RIB CAME LOOSE STRIKIN GHIM. CAUSING FATAL INJURIES SIZE O F ROCK 2'X4'X10'.
VICTIM WAS OPERATING THE REAR 20 TON LOCOMOTIVE OF A TRIP CONSISTING OF 4 CARS AND 2 LOCOMOTIVES. A PIECE OF STEEL (8/X20'X1") ON THE CAR ADJACENT TO THE REAR LOCOMOTIVE CAUGHT ON THE RIBLINE AND CAME OVER TOP OF LOCOMOTIVE THAT VICTIM WAS OPERATING, STRIKING VICTIM. ACCIDENT REMAINS UNDER INVESTIGATION AT THIS TIME.
A SURFACE HAULAGE FATALITY OCCURRED ON ONEIDA MINE NO. 1 REFUSE HAUL ROAD. A MACK RD888SX TANDEM DUMP OPERATED BY THOMAS DAVIE STUMP TRAVELED DOWN GRADE FOR APPROX 5 MILE AND WENT THRU THE BER M AND OVERTURNED, KILLING EE WHO WAS RIDING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT.
Where Robert E Murray stands on silica, penalties, and injury rate
MSHA's standard limits respirable silica to 50 micrograms per cubic metre, but MSHA publishes dust and quartz as separate files and never the silica figure itself. We derive it per sample, score it against the limit, and set the operator's injury rate against a benchmark built from the full MSHA operator record. With the 26-year penalty trail, contest posture, and fatality history. Delivered as a PDF with the underlying data as CSV.
The federal record itself stays free on this site. What costs money, and why.