Beltman
The CM had backed out of the number one entry and began tramming to the number two entry when ee noticed the front MBC on the attached system did not pull ahead. At that time, the victim was found at the MBC suffering from crushing injuries. This resulted in a fatality.
On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, at approximately 4:10 p.m., Kameron Rankin, a 27-year-old mobile bridge carrier operator with 7 weeks of mining experience was fatally injured. The accident occurred when the continuous mining machine was being re-positioned. Because the victim’s mobile bridge carrier was connected to the mining machine, the carrier moved and the victim was crushed between the carrier and coal rib. The accident occurred because the administrative and engineering controls in place at the mine were not adequate to protect the victim from crushing injuries.
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The mine operator did not provide a means of protection against crushing injuries to the MBC operator.
Corrective action: The mine operator installed a substantially constructed equipment operator’s deck for lateral protection against crushing injuries to the MBC operator. The construction of the deck is consistent with the original equipment manufacturer’s design. Additionally, the mine operator installed “man-in-position” safety devices on the MBCs to deactivate the tram motors of the CMM and both MBCs when an MBC operator exits the operator’s deck. The devices prevent restarting the CMM or any MBC until the operator returns to position. The mine operator also instituted preoperational examinations of the man-in-position safety device. The examination and results must be recorded and signed by a foreman, and defects affecting safety must be fixed before any MBC is used.
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The mine operator did not provide a means for the MBC operators and the CMM operator to communicate verbally before the CMM is trammed.
Corrective action: The mine operator provided all MBC operators and the CMM operator with a stand-alone, permissible, two-way voice communication system. The mine operator instituted a company policy that requires the CMM operator to receive verbal confirmation from the MBC operators prior to starting to tram. All CMM and MBC operators have been trained in this policy.
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There was no electronic means provided to prevent the CMM from tramming and dragging the MBC while the MBC was de-energized.
Corrective action: The mine operator installed a system that causes all the tram functions of all electrical components (CMM and MBCs) to be de-energized when one component shuts off, either intentionally or by proximity detection. Additionally, the system requires a physical start-up function that must be performed on each component before any of the components have the ability to tram.
Findings from MSHA's final investigation report, which supersedes the preliminary narrative above.
- Activity at time of incident
- Conveyor Belt
- Subunit / location
- UNDERGROUND
- Underground location
- FACE
- Mining method
- Continuous Mining
- Accident type
- Caught in, under or between a moving and a stationary object
- Source of injury
- BELT CONVEYORS
- Nature of injury
- CRUSHING
- Body part affected
- MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)
- Total mining experience
- 0 years
- Experience at this mine
- 0 years
- Experience in this job
- 0 years
- Degree of injury
- FATALITY
Every record on this page mirrors what MSHA publishes under its Open Government Data program, refreshed weekly. MSHA does not publish per-accident URLs (the Accidents data is distributed as a single bulk file), so this is how to retrieve the source for the specific record below:
- Final investigation report: Read MSHA's final report
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Accident record:
Download MSHA Accidents.zip
then search for Document number
220182640007(the unique key per MSHA Form 7000-1) -
Mine record:
MSHA Mine Data Retrieval System
and search by Mine ID
3609436 - All MSHA datasets: Open Government Data program directory covering Accident, Mines, Inspections, Violations, etc.