Mining Incidents
Fatality · MSHA Record #220210560004

Grizzly Worker

February 22, 2021 at 3:36 PM
Immel Mine · Underground · Metal/Non-Metal
Knox County, TN
Classification POWERED HAULAGE
Type Caught in, under or between a moving and a stationary object
Investigator narrative
A rail haulage offsider was riding back to the chute to get another load when the locomotive over traveled into the chute causing fatal injuries to the offsider rail employee.
Final MSHA investigation
On February 22, 2021, at 3:36 p.m., Cody Scott Maggard, a 26 year-old locomotive operator and chute puller with five years of mining experience, died when he was crushed between the 484 Gallery chute and the deck of the locomotive. The accident occurred because the mine operator did not: 1) properly maintain the braking system on the locomotive, 2) have adequate procedures and rail devices to prevent locomotives from traveling into the chute, 3) have a warning sign or light to alert miners of the low clearance hazard between the chute and operator’s deck of the locomotive, 4) properly conduct an examination of the locomotive, 5) properly maintain the track, and 6) report track hazards or locomotive deficiencies on the workplace examination record.
Root causes
  1. The mine operator did not properly maintain the braking system of the locomotive.

    Corrective action: The mine operator hired OEM personnel to retrain on how to repair brakes on all locomotives. In addition, the mine operator conducted a training session for all maintenance technicians on brake inspection procedures.

  2. The mine operator did not have procedures or rail devices to prevent locomotives from traveling into the chute.

    Corrective action: The mine operator developed a written program containing proper procedures for operating the locomotive. The procedures require the first ore car, behind the locomotive, to be loaded in the middle of the car, which adds an additional five feet of clearance from the locomotive to the chute. Additionally, the mine operator installed two concrete bin blocks and a Nolan derail system behind the chute near the end of the track to prevent the locomotive from contacting the chute (see Appendix E). The mine operator also turned the locomotive engine around so that the locomotive engine is closest to the chute and the operator’s deck of the locomotive is farther from the chute. The mine operator trained all locomotive operators/chute pullers on these procedures.

  3. The mine operator did not have a warning sign or light to alert miners of the low clearance area at the 484 Gallery chute, nor was the chute clearly marked as being a low clearance hazard.

    Corrective action: The mine operator installed a visual and audible alarm to alert the locomotive operator of an upcoming low clearance hazard. The chute was also clearly marked as being a low clearance area. The mine operator installed cameras and monitors in the operator’s deck of the locomotive to ensure visibility of track conditions.

  4. The mine operator did not properly conduct an examination of the locomotive.

    Corrective action: The mine operator established written procedures and trained personnel on how to properly examine the locomotives in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.

  5. The mine operator did not properly maintain the 484 Gallery track. Water accumulations were present above the top of the rail.

    Corrective action: The mine operator installed a drainage system at low areas on the track to prevent water from accumulating on the 484 Gallery track.

  6. The mine operator did not identify hazardous track conditions during the workplace examination.

    Corrective action: The mine operator established written procedures and trained personnel on how to properly examine the tracks for hazards and notify miners of hazards as appropriate.

Read the full report (PDF)

Findings from MSHA's final investigation report, which supersedes the preliminary narrative above.

Record details
Activity at time of incident
Locomotive
Subunit / location
UNDERGROUND
Underground location
LAST OPEN CROSSCUT
Mining method
Conventional Stoping
Accident type
Caught in, under or between a moving and a stationary object
Source of injury
NARO G RAIL CR,MTR-UG EQP
Nature of injury
CRUSHING
Body part affected
TRUNK, MULTIPLE PARTS
Total mining experience
5 years
Experience at this mine
5 years
Experience in this job
1 year
Degree of injury
FATALITY
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Source: US Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) · Document 220210560004 · Mine ID 4000170 Trainer view →