Bulldozer Operator
Full details are not yet known. Employee was lubricating a conveyor and the conveyor was started. Injuries are either from being thrown from the conveyor or being trapped in machinery.
On July 26, 2012, Peter P. Faust, equipment operator, age 49, was killed when he was thrown off the discharge end of a 150-foot long stacker conveyor. Faust was standing on the belt, greasing the head pulley, when a coworker started the stacker conveyor by switching the disconnect to the "on" position. Faust fell off the stacker conveyor 51 feet to the ground below. The accident occurred because management previously directed the electrical panel for the conveyor to be modified, allowing the stacker conveyor's start/stop switches to be bypassed. The wiring was changed to bypass the start/stop switches on the stacker conveyor's electrical panel provided by the manufacturer. At the end of each day and in preparation for the next day, the disconnect switch on the electrical panel located on the side of the stacker was placed in the "on" position so a person could remotely control the stacker conveyor from inside a control van, located approximately 230 feet away. This condition contributed to the stacker conveyor starting by a means other than recommended by the manufacturer. Additionally, Faust was greasing the head pulley on the stacker conveyor and it was not deenergized, locked and tagged out, and blocked against motion. The audible warning device was not sounded, as required, to warn Faust who was working on the stacker conveyor that the conveyor was going to start.
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Management directed the wiring to be modified to bypass the start and stop switches on the stacker conveyor's electrical panel that was provided by the manufacturer.
Corrective action: The wiring was returned to a manufacturer approved design.
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Management did not ensure that safe operating procedures were followed while persons greased the head pulley of the stacking belt conveyor. The victim accessed the stacker conveyor without ensuring that it had been deenergized, locked and tagged out, and blocked against hazardous motion.
Corrective action: Management established policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that belt conveyors were deenergized, locked and tagged out, and blocked against hazardous motion before persons work on them. Management also installed grease lines that could be reached from the ground. A man-lift has also been provided to provide safe access. All miners have been trained regarding these new procedures.
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Management did not ensure that safe operating procedures were followed prior to starting the stacker conveyor. The required audible warning device was not sounded at the location of the accident when the stacker conveyor was started.
Corrective action: A standard operating procedure for sounding the horn before starting the equipment was implemented and all miners were trained accordingly.
Findings from MSHA's final investigation report, which supersedes the preliminary narrative above.
- Activity at time of incident
- Machine Maintenance
- Subunit / location
- STRIP, QUARY, OPEN PIT
- Accident type
- Fall from machine
- Source of injury
- GROUND
- Nature of injury
- MULTIPLE INJURIES
- Body part affected
- MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)
- Total mining experience
- 5 years
- Experience at this mine
- 0 years
- Experience in this job
- 6 years
- Degree of injury
- FATALITY
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- Final investigation report: Read MSHA's final report
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Accident record:
Download MSHA Accidents.zip
then search for Document number
220122090029(the unique key per MSHA Form 7000-1) -
Mine record:
MSHA Mine Data Retrieval System
and search by Mine ID
2102843 - All MSHA datasets: Open Government Data program directory covering Accident, Mines, Inspections, Violations, etc.