Laborer

EE was in the process of opening a 6' thick slab. Water bags were installed at the top of the slab. EE was not wearing a safety harness and was about 20' high. Slab broke and fell down & hit EE and crushed him.

Rony Gustavo Acosta Ordonez, a 26-year old Laborer with approximately one year of experience at the mine, was fatally injured on October 11, 2018, while performing secondary breakage operations on a block of granite. Acosta Ordonez was standing on a previously sawed slab of granite, attempting to further separate the slab from the highwall. He fell between the slab and the highwall when the slab broke free. The accident occurred because the mine operator did not: (1) ensure that work was being performed from a location that did not expose persons to danger during the secondary breakage operation; (2) examine ground conditions; (3) provide adequate task training; and (4) make sure miners were using fall protection.

1. Management did not have policies, procedures and controls for secondary breakage. In preparation for secondary breakage, mine management did not ensure that work was being performed from a location that did not expose persons to danger.

   Corrective action: Mine management developed policies, procedures and new training materials for secondary breakage. The workforce at the mine was retrained using the new policies, procedures and training materials, with additional emphasis on procedures to remove partial slabs. This plan addresses where personnel are to be positioned during the various phases of slab pulling.

2. Mine management did not examine ground conditions, including evidence of prominent faulting, along the south facing highwall prior to work commencing in the area. Approximately three weeks prior to the accident, the upper portion of the slab dislodged along a fault and was removed. Mine management did not evaluate and test the stability of the slab and take necessary steps to prevent a recurrence.

   Corrective action: Mine management developed policies, procedures and new training materials for secondary breakage. The workforce at the mine was retrained using the new policies, procedures and training materials, with additional emphasis on procedures on examining ground conditions. This plan addresses examinations of ground conditions and actions to be taken to address any hazardous conditions found.

3. Mine management did not provide adequate task training to the victim in order to perform his assigned duties safely, including safe work procedures and where to position oneself, once the upper portion of a slab has been removed.

   Corrective action: The mine operator trained miners in a newly developed task training plan with procedures for secondary breakage. This plan addresses safe work procedures and where personnel are to be positioned during the various phases of slab pulling.

4. The mine operator did not assure miners used fall protection where there was a danger of falling. Management did not have policies, procedures and controls for using fall protection when partial slabs, created during secondary mining, were removed.

   Corrective action: The mine operator purchased additional fall protection equipment and trained miners in a newly developed plan with procedures for secondary breakage. This plan addresses and requires the use of fall protection in any area where there is a danger of falling.

Findings from MSHA's final investigation report, which supersedes the preliminary narrative above.

Activity at time of incident

Handling Coal, Rock, Ore

Subunit / location

STRIP, QUARY, OPEN PIT

Accident type

Caught in, under or between a moving and a stationary object

Source of injury

BROKEN ROCK,COAL,ORE,WSTE

Nature of injury

CRUSHING

Body part affected

MULTIPLE PARTS (MORE THAN ONE MAJOR)

Total mining experience

3 years

Experience at this mine

0 years

Experience in this job

0 years

Degree of injury

FATALITY